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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE UNITED STATES’ INDISPENSABILITY IN INDIAN LAND
CLAIMS: THE PROPER APPLICATION OF PROVIDENT
TRADESMENS

“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than
our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith . . . .”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Indian tribes seeking to assert land claims in the United States face
substantial hurdles. Many present land claims have sprung from alleged
abuses and transactions that are over two hundred years old.2 Matters of proof
and the speculative nature of available testimony for these cases present
significant challenges for plaintiffs. Records may be poor and there likely
remain no witnesses to testify. While the passage of time makes it
substantively difficult for Indians to prevail, procedural hurdles can make it
impossible.
Due to the historical link between the federal government and Indian
tribes, a significant number of Indian land claims implicate some action by the
United States.3 Where this is so, defendants may argue that the United States
must be joined in the litigation since its acts are under scrutiny. Courts must
then analyze whether the United States is a necessary or indispensable party.
A four-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson4 guides this
determination. First, a court must consider whether the nature of the litigation
and the parties means the United States should be joined, if possible.5 If the
court makes such a determination, then the United States is a necessary party.6
However, if the United States cannot be joined—perhaps due to its sovereign

1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, v (1982).
2. See, e.g., Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2,
2000).
3. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987), discussed infra
notes 161-200 and accompanying text.
4. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
6. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1989)
(declaring the United States a necessary, rather than indispensable, party).
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immunity—the court must consider whether the suit can properly be
adjudicated in the United States’ absence. If the court determines the suit
cannot be resolved without the United States’ presence, then the United States
is an indispensable party, and the suit must be dismissed.7
A number of Indian land claims have required a determination of whether
the United States was an indispensable party. Four of these, Navajo Tribe v.
New Mexico,8 Lee v. United States,9 Nichols v. Rysavy10 and Sokaogon
Chippewa Community v. Wisconsin,11 are particularly significant. Although
these cases were decided within only two years of each other, the courts used
different processes to determine whether the United States was an
indispensable party. In Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols, where the United
States could not be joined, the courts ruled the United States was an
indispensable party.12 In Sokaogon Chippewa, however, where the United
States also could not be joined, the court ruled the United States was not an
indispensable party and the litigation was allowed to continue.13 A case
recently filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois, Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. Walden,14 raised the issue of the United
States’ indispensability in Indian land claims once again.15 These cases
present an opportunity to evaluate the application of the Provident Tradesmens
test.
This Comment analyzes the process applied in Navajo Tribe, Lee, Nichols
and Sokaogon Chippewa for determining indispensability and offers a
prediction of how the court might rule in Miami. It also serves as a general
introduction to the substantial obstacles Indians face when pursuing land
claims.
Part II provides a brief overview of the federal government’s role in
American Indian history, noting specifically policy that influenced Indian land
rights over the past 200 years. Part III outlines the history and operation of the
7. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1471.
8. Id. at 1455.
9. 809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1987).
11. 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989).
12. See Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472-73; Lee, 809 F.2d at 1411; Nichols, 809 F.2d at
1332-34.
13. See Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305.
14. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000).
15. The author became familiar with the Miami’s claim while working at Dankenbring,
Greiman & Osterholt, L.L.P. (now Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, L.L.P.) from 2000 to 2001.
The firm represented the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma at one point in the litigation. The views
expressed herein are not necessarily those of Dankenbring Greiman & Osterholt, L.L.P., Spencer
Fane Britt & Browne, L.L.P. or the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma. In June, 2001, the Miami dropped
the suit.
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rule on indispensable parties, set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens.16 Part IV
introduces some of the guiding principles regarding the federal government’s
sovereign immunity, which are often raised as a barrier to Indian claims.
Part V presents cases that considered whether the United States was an
indispensable party where sovereign immunity threatened the continuation of
an Indian land claim.17 The Miami claim is also presented in detail at Part V,
and an analysis is set forth of how Provident Tradesmens might be applied to
the facts in Miami.18 Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion on the matters with
which courts should most concern themselves when faced with an
indispensability ruling in an Indian land claim.
II. THE HISTORIC LINK BETWEEN INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
American Indians’ history has been significantly impacted by the federal
government’s actions.19 Occupying, as they do, a quasi-sovereign position in
American federalism, somewhere between a State and a foreign nation, the
courts and Congress have grappled with how to appropriately fashion Indian
rights and remedies.20 This struggle has produced conflicting decisions and
backpedaling by Congress as the federal government moved from one policy to
the next, attempting to determine how to treat the Indian within the American
system.21
A familiar starting point in the history of the United States’ relationship
with Indians is the trilogy of opinions penned by Chief Justice John Marshall:
Johnson v. M’Intosh,22 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia23 and Worcester v.
Georgia.24 These cases represent significant declarations of early Indian
policy and prepared the foundation upon which subsequent Indian

16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
17. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d 300; Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455; Lee, 809 F.2d 1406;
Nichols, 809 F.2d 1317.
18. Mark R. Scherer argues that more studies of the effects of government policy on
individual tribes “are needed because only at the grassroots level can the tangible, human effects
of the shifting tides of federal policy be truly assessed.” See MARK R. SCHERER, IMPERFECT
VICTORIES: THE LEGAL TENACITY OF THE OMAHA TRIBE 1945-1995 xi (1999).
19. Somewhat confusing, however, given their link with the federal government, is the
considerable lack of access Indians have had to judicial remedies. See, e.g., H. D. ROSENTHAL,
THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 12 (1990) (noting that
from 1863-1881 the Court of Claims was closed to Indians, blocking their efforts to obtain
redress for past injustices).
20. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); infra note 56.
21. See SCHERER, supra note 18, at xi.
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
23. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1.
24. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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jurisprudence in the United States rests.25 They provided the opportunity for
Chief Justice Marshall to establish the extent of Indian land rights vis-a-vis the
federal government’s rights,26 to rule on whether an Indian had standing to sue
in federal court27 and to determine the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over tribal
lands.28
United States Indian policy did not originate with these three cases,
however. Just as Chief Justice Marshall analyzed the Indians’ land rights in
Johnson only after a review of the doctrine of discovery and colonial
interactions with the Indians, a proper survey of the origins of the federal
government’s relationship with Indians begins with a review of colonial
institutions and policies.29
A.

The Colonial and Early National Years

The American colonies signed treaties with Indians beginning as early as
Roger Williams’ settlement of Rhode Island in 1636.30 The practice of
entering into treaties with Indians for land was based on three assumptions:
first, that both parties were sovereigns;31 second, that the Indians had some sort
of transferable title and; third, that the transfer of Indian lands must be
transacted by the government, rather than individuals.32 These assumptions
leant credibility to a process under which land was acquired from Indians only
with their consent.33
In the early colonial years, it was important that Indians were dealt with
prudently because, if for no other reason, they outnumbered the colonists.34
Because of their desire to deal fairly with the Indians, the majority of lands the
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886) (citing Cherokee Nation
and Worcester).
26. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 604-05 (holding Indian transfer of real property to any party other
than the United States was unenforceable).
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 (holding the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction
over Cherokee Indians since they were not a foreign nation).
28. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 595-96 (holding a person within the Cherokee reservation was not
subject to the laws of Georgia).
29. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-603. This discussion compromises the bulk of the Johnson
opinion.
30. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (1945) [hereinafter COHEN
FIRST ED.].
31. See generally Stephen B. Young, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and American Fiduciary
Undertakings, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 825 (1987), for a discussion of the necessity of recognizing a
measure of sovereignty in the Indians.
32. COHEN FIRST ED., supra note 30, at 47. It was also Rhode Island where the potential
abuse of individual colonists entering into unauthorized treaties with Indians for the purpose of
purchasing their land first prompted a prohibition of such treaties in 1651. Id.
33. COHEN, supra note 1, at 53.
34. Id. at 55.
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colonies obtained from them were through purchase, rather than treaty.35
Later, during the French and Indian War, the British government assumed
more control over dealings with the Indians.36 Although the Crown played an
important role in preserving peace between the Indians and border settlers, the
colonies returned to negotiating with the Indians following the war.37
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall noted that after the
Revolutionary War the United States continued the native-“potentate”
relationship that the British had established.38 After the war, the administration
of the Articles of Confederation failed to grant the federal government the
authority needed to effectively manage Indian affairs.39 Upon ratification of
the Constitution, however, the individual colonies transferred their authority to
deal with Indians to the federal government.40
The Constitution establishes that Indian commerce is the exclusive domain
of the federal government.41 Apart from mention of Indians with respect to
taxation and representation,42 the “Indian Commerce Clause”43 is the only
reference to Native Americans in the original document.44 Though it does not
mention Indians, the treaty power45 also provides authority for the federal
35. Id.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. at 57-58.
38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).
[T]he extinguishment of the British power . . . and the establishment of that of the United
States in its place led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they
were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the
relation with the United States, which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
Id.
39. See id. at 558-59 (noting that “ambiguous phrases [following] the grant of power to the
United States, were so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the
power [to regulate Indian commerce and affairs]”).
40. See id. at 559. The Constitution
confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with
the Indiana [sic]. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The
shackles imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded.
Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 8.
41. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
42. Id. § 2, cl. 3.
43. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 208. For a discussion of whether the Major Crimes Act of
1885 had its constitutional basis in the Indian Commerce Clause, see United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886), discussed infra Part II.C.
44. But see Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378 (noting Indians mentioned in Fourteenth Amendment).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S.
188, 197 (1876) (holding power to make treaties with Indians coextensive with that to make
treaties with foreign nations).
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government’s actions with respect to Indians.46 While it includes powers that
the federal government might exercise over Indians, the Constitution provides
a less-than-complete description of the proper relationship between the
government and the Indians.47 Thus the relationship, as it evolved early in the
United States’ history, was described as “an anomalous one, and of a complex
character,”48 and “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no
where else.”49
B.

The Marshall Opinions

In Cherokee Nation and Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall had an
opportunity to define the amorphous boundaries of the United States’
relationship with Indians. These cases are recognized as the origins of the
federal government’s “trust relationship” or “guardian role” over Indians.50
Before Chief Justice Marshall could develop this concept, however, he had to
determine the status of Indian nations within the federalism sphere. He did so
in Cherokee Nation.
Marshall noted the unique issues raised by the case,51 but felt constrained
to first address the matter of the Court’s jurisdiction.52 If the Cherokees were
not a foreign nation, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case.53 Finding
that the Framers clearly separated Indians from foreign nations,54 the Court

46. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 207-08.
47. Justice Miller observed that “[t]he constitution of the United States is almost silent in
regard to the relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous tribes of
Indians within its borders.” Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378.
48. Id. at 381.
49. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
50. See, e.g., Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its
Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (1997); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (1975).
51. “If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite
them can scarcely be imagined.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15. The Cherokee Nation brought
suit against the State of Georgia to enjoin it from enforcing its laws within lands designated to the
plaintiffs under treaties with the United States. Id.
52. “Before we look into the merits of the case, a preliminary inquiry presents itself. Has
this court jurisdiction of the cause?” Id. In other cases, Marshall chose to address the matter of
the Court’s jurisdiction only after discussing other issues. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15-16.
54. The Cherokee Nation’s attorneys set forth the argument that the separation of Indian
tribes from States and foreign nations in Article III was an attempt to clarify the federal
government’s power in the area, since the Articles of Confederation had conferred no such power,
but not to separate them from “foreign nation” status. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18. Marshall
answered this by pointing out that the Framer’s would have used language such as “to regulate

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

THE UNITED STATES’ INDISPENSABILITY IN INDIAN LAND CLAIMS

1355

held “that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States [is] not a foreign
state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the
courts of the United States.”55 The unique position the Indians occupied was
not due solely to their status as something more than a State and less than a
foreign nation, but also their dependency on the federal government.56 The
United States’ guardian role developed from this recognition.57
To support the federal government’s role as guardian from the States,58 it
was necessary to acknowledge that the Indians possessed some measure of
sovereignty.59 Without the recognition of Indian sovereignty, the exercise of
power by the United States would be one of conqueror, rather than protector.60
In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the powerful
position the Indians had once occupied in North America, but admitted that
they had gradually sunk “beneath our superior policy, our arts, and our
arms.”61 As a consequence, the Indians “yielded their lands by successive
treaties, each of which contained a solemn guarantee of the residue . . . .”62
Once Marshall recognized a measure of sovereignty in the Indians, he
could structure his description of the relationship of the federal government to
the Indians in affirmative terms. The Indians “acknowledge themselves in their
treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the
United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade
with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper . . . .”63
This language attributing sovereignty to the Indians was critical for the
creation of the federal government’s trust relationship with Indians. Without
commerce with foreign nations, including the Indian tribes, and among the several states.” Id. at
19 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 20.
56. Marshall observed that the Indians were neither a state nor a foreign nation: “In [the
Indian Commerce Clause] they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to
themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the union.” Id. at 18.
57. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).
58. See infra note 94.
59. See generally Young, supra note 31.
60. But see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (leaning heavily on the
doctrine of discovery and concept of the sovereign conqueror). Ultimately the distinction
between protector and conqueror can be viewed as one hinging on which entity derives the most
benefit from the relationship.
61. Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 15.
62. Id. It was that residue which the Cherokee Nation sought to protect in its appearance
before the Supreme Court. Id.
63. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Moreover, as Marshall sorted through the argument that the
Indians were not foreign nations, he phrased his description in a manner which recognized the
Indians’ sovereignty: “[T]he Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
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recognition of the inherent sovereignty of the Indians, there could be no
legitimacy in the Indians yielding a portion of that sovereignty to the federal
government.64 To phrase it contractually, if the Indians had not yielded a
portion of their sovereignty, then there was no consideration to support the
United States’ return promise of protection from the States.65
Just as the recognition of some measure of sovereignty in the Indians was
necessary, so too was an explanation of the Indians’ dependence on the United
States.66 In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall explained that “[t]he Indian
nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
potentate for the supply of their essential wants . . . .”67 The relationship, he
continued, was to be “that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of
one more powerful,” rather than one of a nation “submitting as subjects to the
laws of a master.”68 Thus, the guardian-ward relationship was established.69
Although Cherokee Nation and Worcester created a foundation for the exercise
of the federal government’s power with respect to Indians, the exercise thereof
would fundamentally change in subsequent years.
C. The Federal Government Increasingly Exercises Its Power Over Indians
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the transformation of the
United States’ relationship with the Indians from guardian to complete
sovereign became increasingly noticeable.70 In 1871, Congress discontinued

64. See generally Young, supra note 31.
65. Justice Thompson’s dissent in Cherokee took issue with the concurrence of Justices
Johnson and Baldwin, which emphasized the conquered status of the Cherokee people.
Chambers, supra note 50, at 1216-17. Thompson’s opinion “argued that the Cherokees were not
a conquered people, but an unequal and inferior ally bound by a contractual arrangement (the
treaty) to a more powerful protector nation.” Id. at 1217.
66. Recognition of the dependence of the Indians is also used in Kagama as a justification
for Justice Miller’s expansion of the power of the federal government over Indians. See infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
67. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). Here Marshall explained, inter
alia, the articles of the Treaty of Hopewell between the United States and the Cherokees. Id. at
554-55.
68. Id. at 555.
69. Worcester further contributed to the establishment of a unique position for American
Indians in its holding that ambiguous terms in a treaty should be interpreted as the Indians would
have interpreted them. Chambers, supra note 50, at 1214 n.11.
70. Whether this was really a transformation of power, or just the outward expressions
thereof, is discussed infra note 95. The first of the Marshall Trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), does not comport with the establishment of the federal guardian role
over Indians as Cherokee Nation and Worcester do. In Johnson, a land dispute involving the sale
of land by an Indian and the grant of the same land by the United States government presented the
opportunity for the Court to rule on the enforceability of the transfer of land by an Indian to a
private individual rather than the U.S. government. 21 U.S. at 571-72. Chief Justice Marshall
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the practice of entering into treaties with Indians.71 As a result, the exercise of
the federal government’s power with respect to Indians could no longer be tied
to its treaty power72 and increasingly the federal government’s action was tied
to the authority vested through the Indian Commerce Clause.73
United States v. Kagama,74 which considered the application of the Indian
Commerce Clause, has been cited as the most pronounced evidence of the
transformation of the federal government’s relationship with Indians.75 In
Kagama, the Court considered whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over
an Indian committing murder against another Indian on an Indian reservation.76
The Court had faced nearly identical facts just three years earlier in Ex parte
Crow Dog.77
In Crow Dog, the Court ruled that the conviction of the accused was
improper due to the Territory of Dakota District Court’s lack of jurisdiction.78
In the past, offenses “by Indians against each other were left to be dealt with
by each tribe for itself, according to its local customs.”79 The Court noted that
the “policy of the government in [this] respect has been uniform”80 and that to
uphold the jurisdiction of the district court in this situation “would be to
reverse . . . the general policy of the government toward the Indians . . . from

outlined the doctrine of discovery and cited it as one source of federal dominance and sovereignty
with respect to which transfer would be recognized. Id. at 572-86. Because Johnson justifies the
exercise of the federal government’s power with respect to Indians on the basis of the doctrine of
discovery rather than the Indians’ dependence, it is inappropriate to label all three cases of the
Marshall Trilogy as support for the federal government’s limited guardian role.
71. COHEN, supra note 1, at 208.
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
74. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
75. See, e.g., Aitken, supra note 50, at 116. It is notable that two of the most significant
periods in the development of caselaw regarding the federal government’s role with respect to
American Indians, the early 1830’s (Cherokee Nation and Worcester) and late 1860’s through
mid-1880’s (General Allotment Act of 1877 and Kagama), coincided with times of vigorous
discussion regarding States’ Rights. The Nullification Crisis came quickly on the heels of
Cherokee Nation and Worcester and the significance of Kagama’s proximity to the
Reconstruction Era Amendments should not be ignored. Whether a link can be formed between
the expression of the government’s role with respect to Indians and periods of federalism crisis
remains to be explored elsewhere.
76. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
77. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). There a Sioux Indian murdered another Sioux in Indian country.
Id. at 557. For a definition of “Indian country,” see COHEN, supra note 1, at 27-28.
78. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
79. Id. at 571-72.
80. Id. at 572.
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the beginning to the present time.”81 The Court declined to uphold federal
jurisdiction in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent.82
Congress made a clear expression of its intention in the three years
between Crow Dog and Kagama. In 1885 the Major Crimes Act was passed,
extending the federal courts’ jurisdiction to all, regardless of race.83 Indians
were now subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction even if the crime they
committed was against another Indian or on a reservation.84 In Kagama, the
Court was called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the Major Crimes
Act.85
The Court, speaking through Justice Miller, began its analysis by searching
for Constitutional authority on the matter of the federal government’s
relationship with Indians.86 Miller observed that “[t]he constitution of the
United States is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government
which was established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its
borders.”87 Justice Miller further recognized the Indian Commerce Clause’s
instructive role with respect to the federal government’s power over Indians.88
Miller, however, quickly disposed of the possibility that the Major Crimes Act
was founded upon the authority the Indian Commerce Clause granted
Congress:
[W]e think it would be a very strained construction of this clause that a system
of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left
out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under that
provision, and established punishments for . . . [crimes,] without any reference
to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.89

Following an explanation of the general sovereignty of the United States
over those things within its borders,90 the Court explained the significance of

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1886). For a description of the Act,
see COHEN, supra note 1, at 300-04.
84. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376-77.
85. Id. at 376.
86. Id. at 378.
87. Id.
88. Id. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
89. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 380.
[T]his power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their
inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to disposing
of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property of the
United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the territories are, and the
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the complex relationship between the United States and the Indians, using the
opinions of Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation and Worcester.91
Miller noted that “[i]n the opinions . . . [the Indians] are spoken of as ‘wards of
the nation;’ ‘pupils;’ as local dependent communities.”92 His opinion declares
the Major Crimes Act constitutional, concluding that “[t]he power of the
general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is seccesary [sic] to their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell.”93 This statement, as well as
others throughout the opinion, are evidence that the basis for the court’s ruling
was the Indians’ dependency rather than the Indian Commerce Clause.94
D. An Attempt at Recognition of and Remedies for Past Injustices Visited
Upon Indians: The Indian Claims Commission
With this newly defined power,95 the potential for abuse was great.96 The
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed some of the greatest
injustices endured by Native Americans, including the Battle of Little Big
Horn,97 the Wounded Knee Massacre98 and attempts at assimilation.99
right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national government, and can be
found nowhere else.
Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 382.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States,— dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often
their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
Id. (emphasis original). Basing the exercise of authority on the dependence of the Indians was an
arguably broader basis upon which to legitimize the United States’ action than the Indian
Commerce Clause.
95. While it is tempting to describe the power as an altogether new one, some might argue
that the federal government’s plenary power always existed, but that it was just conceptualized in
different ways. But see generally Aitken, supra note 50, and Chambers, supra note 50, for an
argument that implies the actual power of the federal government, rather than the outward
expressions thereof, was transformed over time.
96. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 127-43 for a general description of this period.
97. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 146-47 (3d ed. 1991).
98. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971).
99. Through assimilation the government hoped to “‘civilize’ the Indian by destroying his
tribal society and forcing him to take his place in American society as an individual.”
ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 17.
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Nonetheless, Indians were able to make a few modest advances. In 1879, a
Nebraska federal district court established Indians to be “persons” for purposes
of Fourteenth Amendment protections, and in 1881, a presidential commission
reopened claims courts to Indians’ suits.100 Significant barriers remained,
however. Although Indians petitioned Congress to allow them to bring their
claims before the Court of Claims, the process brought much frustration, since
“run[ning] a claim through the gauntlet of Congress and the bureaucracy was a
tortuous, frustrating task and the results were meager.”101
Eventually it was recognized that many Indians had legitimate legal claims
for which there should be a remedy and that the process of forcing tribes to
petition Congress for a special jurisdictional statute was ineffective. In 1946,
Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA),102 which created
a special jurisdiction to hear and dispense of these claims.103 The Indian
Claims Commission (ICC) provided an exclusive forum for Indian claims
accruing against the United States prior to 1946.104 If a tribe failed to bring its
claims before the ICC in the five-year window provided by the ICCA, the
claims were barred.105
The ICC’s jurisdiction was extended beyond its original mandate as claims
took longer to resolve than anticipated.106 Eventually in 1978, the ICC’s
remaining docket was transferred to the Court of Claims.107 Many of the cases

100. Id. at 15.
101. Id. at 13.
102. 25 U.S.C. § 70 (repealed 1978).
103. For a description of the Indian Claims Commission see generally MICHAEL LIEDER &
JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE (1997), ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, and IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA
(Imre Sutton ed., 1985).
104. For a discussion of the remedies available under the ICCA, see Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 88 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (holding that in creating the ICC, “Congress established a
special tribunal capable of awarding only money damages as the appropriate measure of
compensation.”). But see Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1465-67 (10th Cir. 1987)
(providing examples of the ICC or its successor, the Court of Claims, hearing cases seeking other
than money damages, including declaratory judgment as to title to land); SCHERER, supra note
18, at 50 (“The [ICCA’s] liberal jurisdictional provisions were significantly tempered, however,
by the limitations of the actual remedial powers exercised by the ICC.”). For a discussion of the
significance of the decision to award money damages, rather than to return land, see generally
Richard Allen Nielsen, American Indian Land Claims: Land Versus Money as a Remedy, 25 U.
FLA. L. REV. (1973). Due to the limitation as to remedy, it may be argued that the ICC was not
the place for a suit seeking something other than monetary damages to be brought against the
United States. The Claims Court’s response in Sioux Tribe and the Tenth Circuit comments in
Navajo Tribe, however, demonstrate the opposition to this position. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
105. See Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1469-70.
106. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 234.
107. Id. The Court of Claims has evolved into the present Court of Federal Claims.
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initially filed in the five-year window ending in 1951 took over thirty years to
resolve.108 Nonetheless, what is most significant about the ICC is that it
represented an opportunity for Indians to redress past injustices that had been
denied them prior to 1946.
There are numerous, and perhaps more significant events and trends that
punctuated the past two hundred years of Native American history. What is
evident, however, from those briefly catalogued here, is the considerable
control the federal government maintained over Indian affairs. This control,
when combined with Indians’ unique position within the federal system,
closely links the protection of Indian rights to the United States’ willingness to
allow or become a party to litigation on the Indians’ behalf.109
III. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
Because of the historical interaction between the federal government and
American Indians, the United States’ indispensability is an issue that may
frequently arise in Indian land claims. While a complete explanation of
indispensable parties is beyond the scope of this Comment, the discussion
below provides a brief introduction to the subject and may serve as the basis
for an understanding of the significant challenge that the question of
indispensability can raise for Indian litigants.
A.

Origins of Indispensability

Questions of indispensability center around who must be present for
adjudication and are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.110 While
the current wording has been in place since the 1966 amendment, the Rule’s
history extends even beyond the Federal Equity Rules of 1912.111 The
Supreme Court’s 1855 decision in Shields v. Barrow112 contributed much of
the Rule’s language:
Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made
parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it decide on,
and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by
adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed
necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties
before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and

108. See, e.g., Sioux Tribe, 8 Cl. Ct. 80 (1985).
109. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
111. See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1601, at
7-8 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 7 WRIGHT].
112. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
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final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are
not indispensable parties.113

The early wording of the Rule led to varying interpretations by lower
courts and improper application of some of the Rules’ vocabulary.114 What
resulted “was judicial concentration on ‘an inward analysis of the nature of the
rights asserted, rather than an outward assessment of the pros and cons of
continuing with the particular case in the face of some incompleteness of
dramatis personae.’”115
Among the criticisms of the Rule was the use of the terms “necessary” and
“indispensable.”116 Some felt the “ready reliance on labels for solutions of
particular cases” should not overshadow “a critical examination [of] the basic
principles of required joinder.”117 Under the current Rule, courts are
encouraged to reach decisions by balancing “pragmatic” considerations, an
approach that is not inconsistent with Shields.118 Ultimately, what the
Advisory Committee sought to influence were not the results of earlier cases,
but the process the courts employed in reaching them.119
B.

The Interaction Between Rules 19(a) and 19(b)

Because it is important to understand the distinction between a “necessary”
and an “indispensable” party, the interaction of subsections (a) and (b) of Rule
19 merits explanation. Rule 19(a) dictates that a person who may be joined
without depriving the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be
joined if:
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may

113. Id. at 139.
114. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 10 (noting improper interpretation of “separable” and “affecting”).
115. Id. (citing Kaplan, Continuing Work on the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 362 (1967)).
116. See, e.g., Challenge Homes, Inc. v. Greater Naples Care Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 667, 669
(11th Cir. 1982).
117. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 11 (quoting Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions,
55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 328-29 (1957)). “The factors now present in Rule 19 bear a strong
resemblance to those suggested criteria.” Id. at 13. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
118. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 16.
119. Id. at 13. See also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
119 (1968) (noting that a court cannot declare a party indispensable until it has examined the
circumstances of the case).
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(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that
interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of the claimed interest.120

The court does not need to proceed to the Rule 19(b) analysis if it is
determined a party is not one who should be joined if feasible under Rule
19(a).121 If, however, a party who should be joined if feasible cannot become a
party because, inter alia, joinder would defeat the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, then the court must decide whether “in equity and good
conscience” the action should proceed.122 If a party is labeled indispensable, it
means the court has determined that, upon application of the “in equity and
good conscience” standard to four factors, the action must be dismissed.123
Hence, a party is only declared indispensable if, after the consideration of
the Rule 19 factors, the court determines the action cannot continue. If, on the
other hand, the court concludes that the action may continue without the absent
party, then the party is not indispensable, but necessary, and its absence is not
fatal to the suit.124 The proper application of the amended Rule’s factors was
set forth in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson.
C. Provident Tradesmens
In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, the Supreme
Court was faced with an early opportunity to interpret and apply the amended
rule on indispensability.125 The Provident Tradesmens litigation was the result
of a car accident that occurred when Edward Dutcher’s car, driven by Donald
Cionci, crossed a median and collided with a truck.126 Three people were

120. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). See generally 7 WRIGHT § 1604.
121. 7 WRIGHT § 1607, at 84.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). An example of a jurisdiction-defeating circumstance would be the
sovereign immunity of one of the parties, discussed infra Part III.A.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment
rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Id.
124. See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989).
125. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
126. Id. at 104.
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killed and one was injured.127 The court questioned whether Dutcher needed to
be present for litigation between the respective insurance companies.128
In proceedings before the district court, Dutcher was limited in his
testimony as to whether Cionci had permission to use the car due to
Pennsylvania’s “Dead Man Rule.”129 Under this rule, Dutcher could not testify
against an estate if he had interests adverse to it.130 Dutcher was allowed,
however, to testify as to the living plaintiff, John Harris.131
The Third Circuit did not address the many state law issues raised on
appeal,132 but reversed on an alternative ground that had not been raised
earlier.133 This ground was that Dutcher was an indispensable party, and the
court held that “the ‘adverse interests’ that had rendered Dutcher incompetent
to testify under the Pennsylvania Dead Man Rule also required him to be made
a party.”134
The Supreme Court recognized that the lower court did not follow the
provisions of Rule 19.135 Labeling the lower court’s approach “inflexible” and
noting that the ruling “presented a serious challenge to the scope of the newly
amended Rule 19” and “exemplifies the kind of reasoning that the Rule was
designed to avoid,” the Supreme Court granted certiorari.136
The Court emphasized that the purpose of examining the four factors was
to determine whether “in equity and good conscience” a court could proceed
without a party.137 The Court analyzed the four factors, but, for convenience,
presented them differently than the exact wording of the Rule.138 The Court
considered, first, the plaintiff’s interest in the forum; second, the defendant’s

127. Id.
128. Id. at 105-06.
129. Id.
130. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 106.
131. Id.
132. The state law issues included “the fairness of submitting the question as to Harris to a
jury that had been directed to find in favor of the two estates whose position was factually
indistinguishable . . . .” Id. at 106 n.1.
133. Id. at 106.
134. Id.
135. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 106-07.
136. Id. at 107.
137. Id. at 109.
138. Id. at 110 n.2. The Court noted that its list followed that presented in Reed, supra note
117, at 330. For a listing of the factors as contained in Rule 19, see supra note 123 and
accompanying text. See also 7 WRIGHT § 1602, at 19-20 (pointing out that although Provident
Tradesmens ordered the factors differently, courts are still required to take into account “much the
same elements when deciding a compulsory-joinder question”).
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wish to avoid multiple litigation;139 third, the interests of the “outsider” who
may be indispensable; and fourth, the interest of the courts and the public in
“complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.”140
In its analysis, the Court paid particular attention to the third factor: the
interests of the outsider who may be indispensable.141 The Court explained
that “since the outsider is not before the court, he cannot be bound by the
judgment rendered,” but that this did not mean “a court may never issue a
judgment that, in practice, affects a nonparty.”142 The Court noted that,
notwithstanding this, a court was obliged to consider the interests of
nonparties.143 The essential question, the Court explained, was whether a
judgment in the absence of the party would “impair or impede” that party’s
ability to protect its interest in the subject matter.144 Finally, the Court
acknowledged that the Rule granted courts the flexibility to shape relief in a
manner that would accommodate the interests articulated in the Rule’s four
factors.145
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s contention that an
indispensable party was a category defined by substantive law and that the
definition could not be altered by rule.146 It held that “whether a particular
lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of that person . . . can only be
determined in the context of the particular litigation.”147 Because a court

139. For the second factor, the Court noted more specifically that it goes to the defendant’s
“wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he
shares with another.” Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 110.
140. Id. at 109-12. Throughout its discussion of the Rule 19 factors, the Court explained
application at both the trial and appellate levels. Id.
141. Id. at 110-11.
142. Id. at 110.
143. Id.
144. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 110.
145. Id. at 111. Justice Harlan noted that “[h]ad the Court of Appeals applied Rule 19’s
criteria to the facts of the present case, it could hardly have reached the conclusion it did.” Id. at
112. In reversing, Justice Harlan particularly noted that the Court of Appeals could have
fashioned appropriate relief if it was concerned with the threat to Dutcher. Id. at 115. The
opinion also explained that, with respect to the fourth factor, once the litigation had reached the
appellate stage, the influence of the preference for efficiency “had entirely disappeared: there was
no reason then to throw away a valid judgment just because it did not theoretically settle the
whole controversy.” Id. at 116.
146. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 116-17.
147. Id. at 118. The court further noted that there was no “prescribed formula for determining
in every case” whether a party was indispensable. Id. at 118 n.14 (quoting Niles-Bement-Pond
Co. v. Iron Moulders’ Union Local No. 68, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920)). “The decision whether to
dismiss . . .must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such factors being
substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing
against opposing interests.” Id. at 118-19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1366

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1349

cannot know “whether a particular person is ‘indispensable’ until it ha[s]
examined the situation to determine whether it can proceed without him,” a
ruling on indispensability compels the court to consider the merits of the
case.148
IV. FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The four factors of the indispensability analysis, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens, provide a framework for considering
a case’s merits. One of the issues that may arise while engaging in an analysis
of a case’s merits with respect to indispensability is the federal government’s
sovereign immunity.
The United States’ sovereign immunity protects it from being named a
defendant without its consent.149 Federal sovereign immunity has long been
recognized, and draws its origins from England, where the King could do no
wrong.150 Although criticized for violating the principle that no one is above
the law, sovereign immunity is justified on several grounds.151 One such
justification is that the government would be hindered were it subject to
liability for every injury it caused.152 Another justification is that sovereign
immunity “furthers the separation of powers by limiting judicial oversight of
executive conduct.”153
The federal government may waive its sovereign immunity, but this waiver
must be clear.154 The waiver must take the form of federal legislation, for the
executive branch may not consent to suit.155 In Indian land claims, courts have
been required to interpret statutes that govern the federal government’s

148. Id. at 119.
149. Overton v. United States, 74 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1038 (D.N.M. 1999). See generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 589-612 (3d ed. 1999).
150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 590.
151. Id. at 590-91.
152. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868), cited in CHEMERINSKY, supra note
149, at 590 n.8.
153. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 590. Chemerinsky notes Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ justification for the United States’ sovereign immunity: “[C]laiming a right to sue the
government is ‘like shaking one’s fist at the sky, when the sky furnishes the energy that enables
one to raise the fist.’” Id. at 591 (citing Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
154. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear
Statement Rules, 4 WIS. L. REV. 771 (1995).
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 589-90. Such legislation has arisen in Miami Tribe of
Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000), discussed infra Part V.F. On
February 28, 2001, Illinois Congressman Tim Johnson introduced a bill that would allow the
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to sue the United States in the Court of Federal Claims. H.R. 791,
107th Cong. (2001).
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relationship with Indians to determine whether these statutes amount to a
waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.156
The United States’ sovereign immunity plays a significant role when
questions of joinder arise. Although a determination that the United States is a
necessary party requires that it be joined if possible, sovereign immunity may
make joinder impossible. If the court then determines the United States did not
waive its sovereign immunity, the court must evaluate whether the federal
government is indispensable.
The federal government’s sovereign immunity is especially critical when
considering the rights asserted by American Indians. Because their history is
inextricably tied to the actions of the United States, many suits brought by
Indians will implicate the interests of the United States.157 These interests
include present-day interests the United States might have in, for instance, real
property,158 or the United States’ interest in not subjecting itself to liability for
past actions.159 Because of the barrier it presents for joinder, the federal
government’s sovereign immunity will often require courts to rule on whether
the United States is indispensable.
V. FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A POTENTIALLY FATAL BLOW FOR
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
A number of cases have presented the issue of whether the United States is
an indispensable party in litigation implicating Indian land interests. Four such
cases, decided over a two-year period, provide examples of different
approaches to the indispensability analysis and different results.160
A.

Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico

In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt added approximately 1.9 million
acres to reservation lands of the Navajo Indians in Arizona and New
Mexico.161 President Roosevelt intended, however, for the reservation of these

156. See, e.g., Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1987) (determining
Indian General Allotment Act was not waiver of United States’ sovereign immunity).
157. See supra Part II.
158. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
“large holding of land claimed by the United States in this case”).
159. See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[The United States] must not fear the consequences of a judgment in this suit.”).
160. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d 300; Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455; Lee v. United States,
809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1987).
161. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457. For a discussion of executive order reservations
generally, see COHEN, supra note 1, at 127-28. See generally Note, Tribal Property Interests in
Executive-Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69 YALE L.J. 627 (1960).
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lands to be temporary.162 In keeping with the Indian policy du jour,163 the land
would be allotted to the Indians individually and then the surplus would be
opened to the public domain.164
Soon after President Roosevelt designated the Navajo land, a New Mexico
congressman introduced a joint resolution that would return all unallotted lands
to the public domain.165 The final version of the resolution provided that
“whenever the President is satisfied that all the Indians in any part of the
[Navajo reservation] . . . have been allotted, the surplus lands in such part of
the reservation shall be restored to the public domain . . . by proclamation of
the President.”166
Near the end of 1908, President Roosevelt restored all unallotted lands
within the Navajo reservation, with the exception of 110 unapproved
allotments, to the public domain.167 In 1911, President Taft restored additional
lands within the reservation.168 The United States thereafter issued patents on
part of the restored lands to the State of New Mexico and others.169
In Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, the plaintiff tribe sought to affirm its title
to lands within its reservation.170 The tribe sought a declaratory judgment that
the United States had breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe by restoring
reservation land to the public domain through President Roosevelt’s actions of
1908 and 1911.171 The tribe argued “that the Executive Orders were null and
void, because they . . . [returned] the unallotted land to the public domain”
before all the Navajos were first granted an allotment.172
The district court dismissed the suit against the United States, holding that
the tribe’s claims were barred because the tribe failed to pursue them under the
ICCA.173 The district court then held the suit could not proceed against the
remaining defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) “in the
absence of the United States as grantor of the patents” through which the
remaining defendants derived title.174
162. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457-58.
163. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
164. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1458. For a discussion of allotment, see generally D.S. OTIS,
THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973).
165. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1458.
166. Id. at 1459.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457.
171. Id. at 1462. In addition, the tribe sought “mesne profits and restitution of all rents,
profits, and other income derived from the defendants’ use of the land . . . .” Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1462. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the ICC.
174. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1462-63.
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On appeal, the tribe argued that their claim was not barred because the ICC
could not hear suits brought for other than money damages.175 The tribe
challenged, inter alia, the dismissal of the suit against not only the United
States, but also New Mexico and the private defendants.176 After discussing
the rationale behind the district court’s holdings,177 the court declined to decide
whether the rationale was persuasive, and embarked upon an independent
analysis.178
The court found the tribe’s assertion that the ICC was “only empowered to
hear controversies involving a ‘taking’ of land179 where Indian title was
concededly extinguished,” a far too restrictive interpretation of the ICC’s
jurisdiction.180 An analysis of the legislative history of the ICCA181 and a preICC case based on special Congressional jurisdiction182 led the court to
conclude that, although the tribe would have had to accept money damages,183
the tribe’s action to quiet title should have been brought before the ICC.184
The court noted that the “restriction as to remedy represents a fundamental

175. Id. at 1463.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1463-64.
178. Id. at 1464.
179. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th
Cir. 1981), upon which “the district court relied chiefly,” involved an alleged unconstitutional
taking under the Fifth Amendment. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1463.
180. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1464.
181. Id. at 1465.
182. Id. at 1466. The court noted that in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, the plaintiff
tribe’s claim “assert[ing] title to lands” was remedied by compensation, rather than the return of
the land, since the lands had subsequently been open to settlement and were now in the
possession of “innumerable innocent purchasers . . . .” Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1466-67 (citing
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926)). For criticism of the heavy
reliance the Navajo Tribe court placed on Yankton Sioux, see Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18
N.M. L. REV. 403, 412-18 (1988).
183. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467. The court further noted that “[b]y restricting the
remedy, the [ICCA] forced the Indian to accept a post factum sale,” and that “[i]t is well within
Congress’ power to provide a forum in which all Indian claims could be heard but to restrict the
remedy available for such claims.” Id. (quoting Note, Indian Breach of Trust Suits: Partial
Justice in the Court of the Conqueror, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 502, 516-17 (1981)). But see
SCHERER, supra note 18, at 50 n.11 (noting that the limitation as to remedy was a decision of the
Commission itself).
184. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467. The court dispensed with the unavailability of a remedy
to return the land to the tribe by noting that the tribe “simply would have had to accept just
monetary compensation if the [ICC] found their claim to title valid.” Id. Tribes have refused to
accept monetary awards, holding out, instead, for the land. See, e.g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 87-88 (1985). The Sioux Tribe court noted that “[a]n action seeking
the return of their ancestral land must be maintained elsewhere,” but failing to name an available
forum. Id. at 88-89.
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policy choice made by Congress out of sheer, pragmatic necessity that . . . land
title . . . could not be disturbed because of the sorry injustices suffered by
native Americans.”185
In response to the tribe’s assertion that affirming the dismissal would be
“tantamount to finding that the ICCA ‘extinguished by implication valid Indian
titles’ and that such a finding constitute[d] ‘a backhanded assertion of eminent
domain powers,’” the court noted that the ICCA provided a “long-overdue
opportunity to litigate the validity of such titles and to be recompensed for
Government actions inconsistent with those titles.”186 The court concluded the
tribe’s cause of action against the United States accrued prior to 1946 and,
therefore, had to be dismissed.187
Following the affirmation of the dismissal of the claims against the United
States, the court turned its attention to the district court’s dismissal of the
claims against the other defendants.188 The court held it would examine the
district court’s ruling under an “abuse of discretion” standard.189 The court
found no such abuse and affirmed the dismissal based on the indispensability
of the United States.190
In making this determination, the court adopted the trial court’s reasoning
as dispositive,191 but briefly reviewed the four factors to be considered when
ruling on indispensability.192 The court used the four factors described in Rule
19(b), rather than the interpretation set forth in Provident Tradesmens.193
Upon considering whether judgment in the absence of the United States would
be prejudicial to it or those already parties, the court remarked that “we need
not consider any possible prejudice to other parties” because “prejudice to the
United States is clear” and “[a] finding . . . that title . . . is vested in the [t]ribe

185. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467. The court noted “a major collateral concern” of
Congress addressed in the ICCA: calming uncertainties regarding title to land. Id. (citing Note,
supra note 183, at 516-17).
186. Id. at 1469 (emphasis original). The court then noted criticisms of statutes of limitations,
but concluded that “[t]hey represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.” Id. at 1470.
187. Id. at 1471.
188. Id. at 1470-71.
189. Id. at 1471. But see Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that due to “fell . . . consequences” of ruling on indispensability, “abuse of
discretion” standard is improper and power of appellate court in this area should be plenary).
190. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1471.
191. Id. at 1471.
192. Id. at 1472. See also supra Part III for a description of the four-factor test for
indispensability.
193. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also
supra Part III.C for the factors as set forth in Provident Tradesmens.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

THE UNITED STATES’ INDISPENSABILITY IN INDIAN LAND CLAIMS

1371

when the United States claims title to much of that land undoubtedly
prejudices the latter’s interests.”194
When considering the second factor, the extent to which the shaping of
relief might ameliorate prejudice to the outside party, the court held that
“prejudice could not be lessened or avoided either through protective
provisions . . . or through the shaping of relief [because title to the
reservation] . . . must be decided entirely or not at all.”195 With respect to the
third factor, the adequacy of a judgment in the third party’s absence, the court
stated that due to the large holding of land claimed by the United States in the
case, “a judgment rendered in its absence would not be adequate.”196
Finally, when considering the fourth factor, whether the plaintiff would
have an adequate remedy if the action was dismissed for nonjoinder, the court
“concede[d] that the [t]ribe ha[d] no such remedy.”197 The court noted,
however, that Rule 19(b) did not state the weight to be given to each factor,
and that “the importance of each factor [must be determined] on the facts of
each particular case and in the light of equitable considerations.”198 After this
reference to its power of discretion, the court explained that if the tribe were
allowed to “avoid the admittedly catastrophic effects under the ICCA of
sleeping on its pre-1946 claim . . . the very intricate and exclusive remedial
scheme that Congress created in the ICCA” would be undermined and the
“interests of innocent, third-party grantees would . . . be disturbed.”199 The
trial court’s dismissal of the claim was affirmed because, the court noted, the
action could not proceed “in equity and good conscience.”200
B.

Lee v. United States

Lee v. United States presented another opportunity to consider whether the
United States was an indispensable party in an Indian land claim. There, the
court faced a dispute over tracts of Alaskan land201 patented to two Alaska
Native corporations202 pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act

194. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1472-73.
197. Id. at 1473.
198. Id.
199. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1473.
200. Id.
201. The land at issue was located in the Eagle River Valley, near Anchorage. Lee v. United
States, 809 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir. 1987).
202. Id. at 1408 (Eklutna, Inc. and Cook Inlet Region, Inc.).
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(ANSCA).203 The plaintiffs, three would-be homesteaders, asserted that the
Native corporations were constructive trustees, holding the disputed land for
their benefit.204 In addition to the two corporations, the suit also named as
defendants the United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management.205
Prior to the lands being patented to the corporations in 1979, the Federal
Power Commission set them aside in 1950 “as a possible site for future power
projects.”206 Two years later, the Commission determined that the lands would
not be adversely affected for the purpose of power development by entry into
the public domain, but despite this determination, the land was never properly
opened to the public domain by the Secretary of the Interior.207 Government
agencies made clear to the plaintiffs on numerous occasions that the land that
they claimed was within the “powersite classification” and would not be
patented to them.208
After dispensing with some other jurisdictional matters,209 the court turned
to whether to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the other
defendants due to the United States’ indispensability.210 The court ruled that
the relief sought by the plaintiffs required the presence of the United States
because establishing their own entitlement would require “direct proceedings
against the United States.”211 It was not enough to show that the “patentee
should not have received the patent; [the plaintiff] must also show that he . . . is
entitled to it [instead].”212 The court dismissed the suit.213

203. For a further description of ANSCA, see generally Marilyn J. Ward Ford and Robert
Rude, ANSCA: Sovereignty and a Just Settlement of Land Claims or an Act of Deception, 15
TOURO L. REV. 479 (1999).
204. Lee, 809 F.2d at 1408.
205. Id. at 1406.
206. Id. at 1407.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1407-08. The Secretary of the Interior responded to a 1959 letter from the
plaintiffs, “pointing out that they were prevented from occupying . . .” the lands. Id. at 1407. The
Bureau of Land Management rejected the homestead applications of the plaintiffs in 1961. Id. at
1407-08. In 1964 the United States patented all the lands not classified as powersites upon which
the plaintiffs homesteaded to the plaintiffs in return for their “agreement to quit asserting claims
to the classified lands.” Id. at 1408. While the government argued that, in light of this
“compromise,” the plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming title to the classified tracts, the
plaintiffs asserted there was no evidence indicating they entered into a compromise. Id. The
court did not reach this issue directly on appeal. Id.
209. See Lee, 809 F.2d at 1410 (discussing plaintiffs’ arguments that they were not barred by
the Quiet Title Act’s disclaimer of interest provision).
210. See Lee v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 721, 734 (D. Alaska 1985).
211. Lee, 809 F.2d at 1411.
212. Id. at 1410-11 (citing Kale v. United States, 489 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1973)).
213. Id. at 1411.
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In reaching its conclusion on indispensability, the court did not include a
weighing of the Rule 19 factors in its analysis.214 The court did not specify the
basis for its ruling. The court did acknowledge, however, that upon different
facts the United States might not have been indispensable.215
C. Nichols v. Rysavy
In Nichols v. Rysavy, the court ruled the United States was an
indispensable party after considering the factors from Provident
Tradesmens.216 The plaintiffs claimed that the fee simple patents their
ancestors acquired from the United States were illegally issued.217 Due to the
illegality of the patents, the plaintiffs argued, the subsequent transfers of the
South Dakota property were void.218
The patents at issue were of land originally allotted by the General
Allotment Act and held in trust by the federal government.219 The Burke Act,
passed by Congress in 1906, established a scheme under which Indians were
presumed incompetent to hold the patents in fee until the Secretary of the
Interior was “satisfied that [an] Indian allottee [was] competent and capable of
managing his or her affairs.”220 The Burke Act shifted the burden of issuing
fee patents from Congress to the Secretary of the Interior.221 Furthermore, the
Secretary could now issue the fee patents before the trust period expired.222
For the next ten years, Indians who applied and were deemed competent,
“generally on the local Indian superintendent’s recommendation,”223 were
granted fee patents before the trust period had fully run. In 1916, this policy
changed, and “competency commissions” would visit reservations and issue
fee patents to allottees they determined were competent, whether or not the
allottees had applied for a patent.224 This “forced fee patent” policy was

214. Id. (citing Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331-34 (8th Cir. 1987)). But see id. (“See
generally Fed.R.Civ.P. [sic] 19(b).”).
215. Id.
216. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1333-34.
217. Id. at 1320.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1321. For a description of the Indian General Allotment Act, see COHEN, supra
note 1, at 130-38.
220. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1321.
221. Id.
222. Id. One explanation for the shift in responsibility was that the Secretary of the Interior
and the Indian Department “[knew] best when an Indian ha[d] reached such a stage of civilization
as to be able and capable of managing his own affairs.” Id. at 1322. Another was that the Burke
Act was “‘intended to accelerate the assimilation of the Indians . . . .’” Id. (citing Nebraska v.
Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212, 1219 (8th Cir. 1978)).
223. Id. at 1322.
224. Id.
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intended to directly place the burden of independence on the Indians.225 The
burden was cast even more directly in 1917 and 1919 when Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Cato Sells’ declarations provided for the issuance of fee patents
to adult Indians of the half-blood without investigation—their competence was
presumed.226
Due to these policies, “[t]housands of Indians in the western United States
received forced fee patents, with primarily harsh results.”227 One court noted:
Abuses were rampant: it is clear from the historical evidence that many patents
were issued to Indians obviously incapable of taking on the burdens of
unrestricted property ownership in the midst of a more sophisticated white
society. It is clear that some holders of these patents were cheated out of their
land by speculators and merchants, and that some land was lost when the
Indians sold or mortgaged it for money to pay state property taxes, taxes which
could not be legally assessed . . . .228

Others became aware of the abuses. For example, Charles H. Burke,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the incoming Harding Administration,
abolished the forced fee and required application and competency
examinations before patents would be issued.229 Later Congressional action
returned patented lands to trust status and extended the trust period
indefinitely.230
After hearing these historical facts and wading through a number of
jurisdictional statutes and analyzing whether the claim was barred due to a
statute of limitations,231 the court concluded that the United States could not be
sued and turned its attention to whether the federal government was an
indispensable party.232 The court noted that in its ruling on indispensability it
would be mindful of Provident Tradesmens233 and acknowledged the Supreme
Court’s “reject[ion of] an inflexible and formulistic approach to joinder
problems.”234

225. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1322.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Bordeaux v. Hunt, 621 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D.S.D. 1985)).
229. Id. at 1323.
230. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1323. Ultimately less than 500 forced fee patents were returned to
trust status under these statutes. Id.
231. The court considered, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (providing a six-year statute of
limitations for suits against the United States), the Quiet Title Act and the Indian Claims
Limitation Act of 1982. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1323-31.
232. Id. at 1331-34.
233. Id. at 1332.
234. Id.
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The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ interest in the forum weighed
heavily in favor of the tribe.235 It noted that “‘better joinder’ in another forum
would still be an impossibility regarding the United States,” since the
principles regarding sovereign immunity would still apply.236 The court also
considered the second and third Provident Tradesmens factors, regarding the
defendant’s wish to avoid multiple litigation and the interests of the outsider
who might be joined.237 While noting that “the government’s liability cannot
be tried ‘behind its back’”238 and pointing out circumstances where the United
States did not need to be a party,239 the court distinguished the case before it.
It explained that the claim was based on the argument that the government
wrongfully issued the patents and, as such, directly implicated the actions of
the United States.240 The court did not directly address the multiple liability
threat to the defendants other than the United States.241
In its analysis of the fourth factor, the interest of the court and the public to
complete, consistent and efficient settlement of controversies, the court
considered the far-reaching effects of clouded real estate titles and the validity
of fee patents issued by the United States: “If these fee patents can be
successfully attacked, the entire United States title system is in jeopardy.”242
The court noted that title insurance companies might face financial ruin and
that land would be removed from the local tax base.243 In light of these
catastrophic results, the court concluded that the fourth factor, as well as the
combination of the other three, weighed in favor of dismissal.244
D. Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Wisconsin
The Seventh Circuit was faced with the question of the United States’
indispensability in an Indian land claim in Sokaogon Chippewa v.
Wisconsin.245 The plaintiff tribe’s complaint was founded on two treaties that
had been signed by the United States in 1842 and 1854.246 The 1842 treaty
ceded to the United States a large tract of land in return for “various promises
235. Id.
236. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1332-33.
237. Id. at 1333.
238. Id. (quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 375 (1945)).
239. Id. (explaining that where an Indian allottee did not receive his bargained-for
consideration or where it was alleged that allotments were transferred by forged deeds, the
“dispute[s] did not appropriately involve the United States”).
240. Id.
241. See Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1333.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989).
246. Id. at 301.
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and other consideration,” including “the right of hunting on the ceded territory,
with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until required to remove by the
President of the United States.”247 The court concluded that the plan was to
eventually move the tribe west of the Mississippi River.248 Resistance to this
plan, however, brought about a second treaty in 1854.249 This treaty promised
the tribe “substantial land east as well as west of the Mississippi, including
land in Wisconsin.”250 The land disputed by the plaintiff tribe in Sokaogon
Chippewa was allegedly included in the land granted by the 1854 treaty.251
Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted that the complaint alleged the
United States “reneged on [its] promise” by not building a reservation for the
tribe on the disputed tract.252 Although the tribe did not allege exactly when
the United States “reneged” on its promise, the tribe’s complaint did claim that
the Sokaogon lost possession of the tract within just a few decades of signing
the treaties.253 Apart from the apparent violation of the 1854 treaty,254 because
the United States did not satisfy a condition of the 1842 treaty, the tribe argued
the right of occupancy conferred on the tribe never terminated.255 The tribe’s
complaint also alleged the United States granted “mineral and other rights to
various persons . . . in derogation of the tribe’s rights.”256
The court quickly disposed of the matter of whether the tribe could sue the
United States. It held that because the tribe’s “cause of action against the U.S.
must certainly have accrued well before August 13, 1946,” the critical date for
claims brought before the ICC, it was too late to sue the federal government.257

247. Id. (emphasis original).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 301.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 301-02.
253. Id. at 302.
254. See supra text accompanying note 250.
255. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 302. See also supra note 247 and accompanying text.
256. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 302. One of the named defendants was Exxon
Corporation, who, it was alleged, had been exercising mineral rights in the disputed tract. Id. at
301.
257. Id. at 302. The tribe was unsuccessful in arguing that the United States should be
estopped from pleading the ICC’s statute of limitations “because [the United States] interfered
with the tribe’s obtaining adequate legal representation.” Id. The tribe’s complaint alleged the
Bureau of Indian Affairs “encouraged the ‘agglomerating’ of all Chippewa claims into a single
claim for presentation to the [ICC] and that the law firm picked by the Bureau . . . unaccountably
failed to include the [tribe’s] claim.” Id. The court noted that for estoppel to apply there had to
be some misconduct. Id. This misconduct, it noted, was not commitment by the Bureau, whose
desire to pool claims was “reasonable and sensible,” but by the law firm. Id. (noting that there
may have been no misconduct by the firm, either). The tribe was bound by the attorneys chosen
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The tribe argued, however, that insofar as the 1842 treaty granted a right of
use, rather than a right in fee simple, the cause of action did not accrue until
1976, when defendant Exxon began fencing the land.258 The tribe further
noted that the Quiet Title Act provided a twelve-year statute of limitations,
which had not run when their suit was filed in 1986.259
The court dismissed this argument, however, noting that the statute of
limitations had run because, the court assumed, the tribe had discovered prior
to Exxon’s activity on the land that the United States had asserted “in the tract
inconsistent with the tribe’s occupancy rights.”260 In support of this, the court
noted the existence of vacation homes and other private residential buildings
which should have been sufficient evidence to the tribe that the United States
“may at some time have infringed the Indians’ right of occupancy which had
been reserved in the treaty.”261
Finding that the district court had properly dismissed the United States,
Judge Posner moved on to the issue of indispensability and whether the suit
against the remaining defendants needed to be dismissed.262 The court noted
the lack of case law on the standard of appellate review of a Rule 19(b)
determination, but stated that most cases, including Provident Tradesmens263
and a number of Seventh Circuit decisions, “implicitly treat[ed] appellate
review as plenary.”264 Because the “finding of indispensability [was] so fell in
its consequences,” the court declined to follow the narrow standard of review
used in Navajo Tribe.265
After establishing the plenary power of review of a ruling on
indispensability, the court ruled that “[u]nder any standard, the district court’s
determination that the U.S. is an indispensable party must be reversed . . . .”266

by the Bureau because “Indian tribes are not permitted to make contracts that are not approved by
the [Bureau,] . . . including contracts with attorneys.” Id.
258. Id. at 302-03.
259. Id. at 303. The court noted that the Quiet Title Act allowed the naming of the United
States as a defendant in a real property dispute in which the government claimed an interest. Id.
260. Id.
261. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 303.
262. Id.
263. See supra Part III.
264. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 303. Judge Posner noted the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in Navajo Tribe, where the court stated that “since evaluation of indispensability ‘depends to a
large degree on the careful exercise of discretion by the district court,’ we will only reverse a
district court’s determination for abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico,
809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir. 1987)). See also supra Part V.A.
265. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304.
266. Id. The court noted that “none of the considerations listed in the rule and elaborated in
Provident Tradesmens or other cases provides any support for the district court’s determination.”
Id.
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The court explained how its analysis of the four factors from Provident
Tradesmens led it to this conclusion.267 The plaintiff had “no other route for
establishing its rights in the tract,”268 and the remaining defendants were not at
risk of multiple liability.269 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the United States
must not have feared the consequences of a judgment in the suit because it had
“declined to take any position on its indispensability.”270 As for the fourth
factor, the public’s interest in resolution, the court ruled that “public interest
favors where possible the resolution of legal questions on the merits” and that
it “also favors repose, but [that] this aspect . . . is secured by statutes of
limitation.”271 The court stated that if “the Sokaogon have a good claim to this
land, they ought not be barred from prosecuting it by their inability to sue an
entity perhaps only remotely involved in their dispute with Exxon and the
other occupiers.”272

267. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; supra Part III (describing the difference
between the factors considered by the court in Navajo Tribe and those outlined in Provident
Tradesmens).
268. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304.
269. The court found the contrary to be true, noting that the defendants would have the
opportunity to bring suit against the United States if, in fact, the defendants did lose the suit. Id.
The court expressed no view on the merits of such a charge against the United States but
explained that because the nature of the Rule 19(b) inquiry involved a weighing of intangibles,
the force of precedent was limited. Id.
At this point the court strayed a bit from the Provident Tradesmen factors. Here, the
court examined the defendant’s risk of multiple liability, whereas in Provident Tradesmens, the
Court’s second factor was the defendant’s risk of multiple litigation. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text. The difference is worth noting, since multiple litigation is a possibility in
situations where the threat of multiple liability is not present.
270. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304.
271. Id. The court later noted the interests of amici American Land Title Association about a
suit which could “unsettle titles throughout a large tract of land.” Id. at 305. In response, the
court stated that “many legal wrongs were done to the Indians, and the Supreme Court recently
held that an Indian tribe could bring a suit to recover land conveyed to the State of New York
almost two centuries ago.” Id. (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226
(1985)).
272. Id. at 304. The court noted:
To exaggerate slightly . . . it is as if every time someone claimed that someone else was
encroaching on his property he would have to sue not only the alleged encroacher (here
Exxon) but also the alleged encroacher’s predecessors in title right back to King James or
Lord Baltimore (here in the U.S.). So far as can be determined . . . the relationship of the
U.S. to the Indians’ controversy with Exxon and the other occupiers of the land in
derogation of the Indians’ alleged occupancy rights is that of a predecessor in title (to
Exxon), no more.
Id. at 304.
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After distinguishing the case at bar from three cases holding the United
States was indispensable,273 the court placed much emphasis on the failure of
the United States to disclaim indispensability.274 While acknowledging the
complaint’s allegation that “the U.S. made grants in derogation of the
plaintiff’s treaty rights,”275 the court noted that the record was unclear on when
and to whom these grants were made and ruled that the district court would
have to straighten out these matters on remand.276 In the end, the court found
the United States to be merely a necessary, rather than an indispensable party.
E.

Reconciling the Circuit Split

Sokaogon Chippewa’s outcome differs significantly from that in Navajo
Tribe, Lee and Nichols. In Sokaogon Chippewa, the court recognized the
precarious position in which Indian litigants are placed and applied the
Provident Tradesmens process to reach an outcome that allowed the tribe’s
action to proceed.
The facts of the cases also provide some evidence of why there was a
difference in outcomes. In Sokaogon Chippewa, the court noted what might be
the most significant factor distinguishing these cases: the United States’
interest.277 In Navajo Tribe, the United States itself claimed the land in
question.278 The United States made no such claim to the disputed land in
Sokaogon Chippewa. In Lee and Nichols, the government was subject to
potential liability.279 In Sokaogon Chippewa, Judge Posner noted that if the
United States had any fear of liability it likely would have expressed an
opinion regarding whether it was indispensable.280
It seems logical that the nature of the disputed land might have influenced
the outcome of the cases. In Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols the disputed land
was located in relatively desolate areas: New Mexico, Alaska and South
Dakota.281 The tract of land considered in Sokaogon Chippewa, however, was
further east, in Wisconsin, where the population density was likely higher.
273. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304-05 (discussing Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols).
The court distinguished these cases on the grounds that in two of the cases the United States was
“clearly exposed to potential liability” and that in the third “property rights claimed by the U.S.
were in jeopardy.” Id.
274. Id. at 305.
275. Id. The Sokaogon Chippewa court’s reasoning differs from the Nichols court’s by
holding that the “directness” of the claim regarding the United States’ actions was not sufficient
to merit finding the United States indispensable. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
276. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305.
277. See supra note 273.
278. See Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. The opinions in these cases give no description of the disputed land.
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Furthermore, the presence of copper and zinc on the land made its value
substantial.282 Judge Posner directly confronted the concerns of the American
Land Title Association regarding the ruling’s potential effect on land titles
throughout the region.283 His dismissal of the Association’s concerns
demonstrated his willingness to look around the characteristics of the land to
allow the tribe’s litigation to continue. Ultimately, however, the outcomes
defy common sense; the suit disputing title to the more valuable land was
allowed to continue and those to the more desolate lands were halted.
The difference in these cases may also boil down to the strength of the
interests the Indian-claimants held. In Lee and Nichols, the Indians claimed
title through congressional enactments.284 In Navajo Tribe, the plaintiffs’
claim was based on executive orders.285 In Sokaogon Chippewa, however, the
claim was founded on treaties between the plaintiff tribe and the United
States.286 The court may have held the interests the tribe acquired through the
treaty with the United States higher than those acquired through legislation or
executive order. Unfortunately, the opinions shed little light on this score.
It is possible other factors contributed to the different rulings by the
Navajo Tribe, Lee, Nichols and Sokaogon Chippewa courts. These decisions
illustrate, however, that the four factors of the indispensability analysis leave
courts ample room to entertain myriad considerations.
F.

The Miami Claim

In 1795, the United States signed the Treaty of Greenville with a number
of Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory.287 The purpose of the treaty was
“[t]o put an end to destructive war, to settle all controversies, and to restore
harmony and a friendly intercourse” between the United States and the
signatory tribes.288 The treaty established “a boundary line between what
would be considered United States lands to which Indian title had been
relinquished and what would be considered remaining Indian lands, the title to

282. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 301. Although the court recognized that the land was
rural, it acknowledged the presence of “federal and state public lands . . . vacation homes, farms,
and other private residences.” Id.
283. Id. Title insurance companies filed amicus briefs with the court in Nichols, as well. See
Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1987).
284. See generally supra Part V.B, C.
285. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
287. Treaty with the Wyandots, 7 Stat. 49 (1795). Parties to this treaty included the
Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawatomies, Miamis, Eel River,
Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskia. Id.
288. Id.
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which had been recognized and not relinquished.”289 In essence, the United
States recognized that a great deal of the “Northwest” was the possession of
Indians, but did not attempt to specifically recognize which tribe possessed
which parcel of land until a later time.290 In return for this recognition, the
Indians ceded to the United States much of present-day Ohio.
The federal government signed the Treaty of Grouseland291 with the Miami
Indians ten years after the Treaty of Greenville to resolve the issue of which
lands specifically belonged to the Miami.292 The Miami claimed that in the
Treaty of Grouseland the government recognized the Miami “as having
exclusive title, ownership and right to possession of . . . the Wabash
Watershed . . . .”293 The language of the treaty appears to confirm this.294 The
tribe claimed that because the United States never “adopt[ed] a treaty or
convention as federal law required,” the tribe retains treaty-recognized title to
the Wabash Watershed lands in Illinois.295
In June of 2000 the Miami filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois against twenty-five landowners in fifteen
different counties in east-central Illinois.296 The tribe sought declaration of its
treaty-recognized title to the land, possession of the land, and damages “for the
period during which it was unlawfully deprived of possession.”297 The tribe
claimed rightful title to the disputed land under the Greenville and Grouseland
treaties.

289. Complaint for Possession of Indian Tribal Lands, Damages and Declaratory Judgment,
Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG, ¶6 (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000)
[hereinafter Miami Complaint].
290. See id.
291. Treaty of Grouseland, 7 Stat. 91 (1805).
292. See Miami Complaint ¶¶1, 7-8.
293. Miami Complaint ¶8.
294. Treaty of Grouseland, 7 Stat. 91, Art. IV (1805).
[I]n order to quiet their minds on that head, the United States do hereby engage to
consider them as joint owners of all the country on the Wabash and its waters, above the
Vincennes tract, and which has not been ceded to the United States, by this or any former
treaty; and they do farther engage that they will not purchase any part of the said country
without the consent of each of the said tribes. Provided always, That nothing in this
section contained, shall in any manner weaken or destroy any claim which the Kickapoos,
who are not represented at this treaty, may have to the country they now occupy on the
Vermillion river.
Id. at 91-92 (emphasis original). It is likely one of the disputed issues in the Miami litigation,
should the case reach trial on the merits, will be the meaning of “the Wabash and its waters.”
295. Miami Complaint ¶11.
296. See id. ¶¶1-3. The State of Illinois was not named a defendant.
297. Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion of the State of Illinois to Intervene for
the Limited Purpose of Moving to Dismiss, Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Opposition to State’s Intervention].
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In August of 2000, the State of Illinois filed a Motion to Intervene for the
Limited Purpose of Moving to Dismiss (State’s Motion).298 In the State’s
Motion, Illinois asserted that the suit threatened its “sovereignty and
jurisdiction over, and thus its power to regulate and tax, activities on the
tracts . . . .”299 The State’s Motion also noted that the Miami’s complaint
“attacks the actions of the United States government.”300 Illinois argued that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because of the
sovereign immunity of the State and the federal government and that, because
itself and the United States were indispensable parties, the suit must therefore
be dismissed.301 The United States did not assert a position with respect to its
indispensability in the Miami litigation. On March 30, 2001 the State’s Motion
was granted and Illinois was allowed to intervene.
Had the suit not been dismissed, the court would have had to apply the
Provident Tradesmens factors to determine whether the United States was, as
Illinois argued, an indispensable party. The first factor, the plaintiff’s interest
in the forum, weighed heavily in favor of a ruling that the United States was
not an indispensable party. The Miami had a great interest in the suit’s
proceeding in federal court since no other forum was available.
In the State’s Motion, Illinois offered Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho302 as support for the argument that were the Miami to succeed and be
granted title to the lands they seek, Illinois’ sovereignty interests and Eleventh
Amendment protections would be jeopardized.303 In Coeur d’Alene, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[s]tates have real and vital interests in
preferring their own forum in suits brought against them . . . .”304 Hence, the
Court refused to allow the suit to continue under the Ex parte Young

298. See Motion of the State of Illinois to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Moving to
Dismiss, Miami, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG [hereinafter State’s Motion to Intervene]. This motion also
presented the issue whether Illinois could intervene in the suit without waiving its sovereign
immunity. In an October 19, 2000 Order, the court invited Illinois to show cause why the court
should not deny its motion to intervene for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
299. State’s Motion to Intervene ¶1. The State identified no property interest that was
threatened by the suit. See generally State’s Motion to Intervene.
300. State’s Motion to Intervene ¶2.
301. Id.
302. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
303. Motion of the State of Illinois to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Miami
Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000) [hereinafter State’s
Motion to Dismiss]. One of the potential confusions in the State’s motion was its reference to
“sovereign immunity” and “sovereign interests.” “Sovereign immunity” likely refers to the
Eleventh Amendment concerns, while “sovereign interests” implicated the State’s alleged
interests in taxing and regulating land within its borders. See generally id.
304. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 274.
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exception,305 noting that the Idaho state courts would provided “an adequate
judicial forum.”306
Unlike the plaintiff tribe in Coeur d’Alene, the Miami had no alternative
forum in their case. Although the Illinois state courts exercise general
jurisdiction,307 Illinois could not be made a party or defendant without its
consent,308 and the state had given its consent to suit only under very narrow
circumstances, none of which opened the state courts to the Miami’s claim.309
Apart from the question whether an alternative forum is available,
however, is that of the proper method of analyzing the first factor. When the
Nichols court considered the first of the Provident Tradesmens factors, access
to an alternate forum, the court held that no other forum would provide for
“better joinder.”310 Structuring the analysis in this manner—asking whether
“better joinder” of the United States was available elsewhere, rather than
whether any forum is available if the party is joined—limits the impact of this
consideration when confronted with the potential joinder of the United States.
Due to the federal government’s sovereign immunity, which applies in all
forums, there will be no forum for “better joinder.”311 The proper inquiry to
make is whether the suit could be brought elsewhere. If the answer is no, the
factor weighs against a ruling of indispensability. By altering the wording of
the first factor, the Nichols court substantially tilted the balance in favor of an
indispensability ruling.
The application of the first Provident Tradesmens factor differed
significantly in Sokaogon Chippewa from that employed in Nichols. In
Sokaogon Chippewa, Judge Posner explained that the plaintiff tribe had “no
other route for establishing its rights . . . .”312 Considering the first factor in
this manner favors plaintiffs; where “better joinder” is possible, the suit may be
refiled after dismissal. Where “better joinder” is not available, the factor
weighs against a ruling of indispensability as it did in Sokaogon Chippewa.313
Ultimately for the Miami, the unavailability of an alternative forum for the
305. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 412-16.
306. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 274.
307. The state courts may adjudicate any matter coming to them at common law, as well as
those over which they are given jurisdiction by statute. In re Schauberger, 624 N.E.2d 863, 869
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993). See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
308. See ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2000).
309. Actions may be brought against the State pursuant to the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act and the Court of Claims Act. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2000).
310. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part IV.
312. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
313. It can also be argued the failure of the United States to assert a position with respect to
its indispensability played a significant role in the Seventh Circuit’s holding. See supra note 270
and accompanying text.
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plaintiff tribe would have weighed heavily in favor of a ruling that the United
States was not an indispensable party.
The second and third Provident Tradesmens factors also would have
counseled a ruling that the United States was not an indispensable party.
Illinois had not identified any risk the defendant landowners faced for multiple
litigation.314 As for the interests of the party to be joined, the United States had
not asserted a position with respect to its indispensability so, as Judge Posner
noted in Sokaogon Chippewa, the United States “must not fear the
consequences of a judgment in this suit.”315
In considering the fourth factor, the interest of the courts and the public to
complete settlement of controversies, the Nichols court noted the potential
effect of clouded real estate titles, which would affect “real estate transactions,
probate proceedings, and credit availability.”316 The significant amount of
land at stake in Miami may have provided the court the leverage it needed to
rule that the United States was an indispensable party based solely on this
fourth factor. It is difficult to fathom, however, how a court could make an
indispensability determination “in equity and good conscience,” as demanded
by Rule 19, without also considering, under the fourth factor, the historical
injustices suffered by the Miami.317
Although there may be room to argue that a weighing of the Provident
Tradesmens factors produces no clear result, the court may not have been
forced to make such a determination. In the State’s Motion, Illinois failed to
allege facts and circumstances necessary for an indispensability ruling.318
In the State’s Motion, Illinois argued that the court

314. See Memorandum in Support of the State of Illinois’ Motion to Dismiss, Miami Tribe of
Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000). It is possible, however, that
were the defendant landowners found liable, they might choose to proceed against the United
States and Illinois.
315. Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989).
316. Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1333 (8th Cir. 1987). Although the Navajo Tribe
court considered a formulation of the indispensability analysis which left out the consideration of
this factor, it was conscious of the “in equity and good conscience” standard under which the
indispensability determination should be made. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455,
1473 (10th Cir. 1987).
317. In Sokaogon Chippewa the court was sensitive to the interests of the plaintiff tribe.
Although it mentioned the potential disruption to real estate titles voiced by amicus American
Land Title Association, it countered this by acknowledging that “on the other hand many legal
wrongs were done to the Indians.” Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 305
(7th Cir. 1989).
318. The following analysis is based on the motion to dismiss filed with the State’s Motion.
See State’s Motion to Dismiss. Illinois’ motion to dismiss filed after its motion to intervene was
granted was likewise deficient in its failure to address the indispensability factors as set forth in
Provident Tradesmens and as applied in Sokaogon Chippewa.
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lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the [Miami’s] complaint attacks the
actions of the United States government. This Court has no jurisdiction to
review the validity of those actions because the United States has sovereign
immunity, and has not consented to be sued in this Court. The United States is
therefore an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and
the [Miami’s] action cannot go forward against the existing defendants because
the United States’ conduct cannot be tried in its absence.319

Illinois further claimed that “[w]ithout the United States’ participation as a
defendant, the Miami’s claims against the existing defendants in this case must
be dismissed because the United States is a ‘necessary’ and ‘indispensable’
party to this action under [Rule 19].”320 This conclusion is the result of an
improper formulation of the process set forth in Provident Tradesmens for the
proper determination of indispensability.
The equation argued by Illinois was that because 1) the suit implicates past
federal action and 2) the United States cannot be sued, 3) the federal
government is therefore an indispensable party.321 A proper argument would
have been that 1) the interests of the United States in this case are great and
therefore 2) it is a necessary party who should be joined if possible, but 3)
because of sovereign immunity they cannot be joined so 4) due to the
overwhelming weight of the Provident Tradesmens factors, the United States is
indispensable and the suit must be dismissed.
Illinois’ argument represents the type of reasoning the Supreme Court
sought to discourage by its holding in Provident Tradesmens.322 The issue of
sovereign immunity should not be raised until the court has determined that
Illinois is a necessary party under Rule 19(a).323 If the court concluded that the
United States was a necessary party, then it would proceed to the
indispensability analysis. Only in the context of considering indispensability
would the court consider the acts of the federal government, whether the suit
would amount to a review of its conduct and, finally, whether sovereign
immunity bars joinder.
To declare that the federal government was indispensable merely because
its actions were implicated and sovereign immunity protected it would be to
ignore the process mandated by Provident Tradesmens. There, the Court noted
that “whether a particular lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of [a
person] can only be determined in the context of [the] particular litigation.”324

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

State’s Motion to Intervene ¶2.
State’s Motion to Dismiss ¶8.
See id.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968).
See supra Part III.B.
Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118.
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Illinois linked the Miami’s claims to action of the federal government only
briefly:
[T]he United States entered into the Treaty of Grouseland with the Tribe,
admitted the State of Illinois into the Union under its current borders in 1818,
disposed of the claims urged by the Miami in treaties ratified after the Treaty
of Grouseland, and issued federal fee patents to the land claimed by the
Tribe.325

Illinois alleged no other basis, apart from the United States’ sovereign
immunity, upon which to base a ruling that the United States is
indispensable.326
Illinois’ suggestions ignored the four factors set forth in Provident
Tradesmens. The State did not address the Miami’s interest in the forum, the
defendant landowners’ potential for multiple litigation, the United States’
failure to assert a position with respect to its indispensability, or the interests of
the public regarding the settlement of this controversy.327 Illinois’ apparent
belief that the mention of federal action coupled with the existence of federal
sovereign immunity would be enough to trigger a declaration of
indispensability ignores the fact that a court “does not know whether a
particular person is ‘indispensable’ until it ha[s] examined the situation to
determine whether it can proceed without him.”328
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts seeking to apply Provident Tradesmens properly in Indian land
claims should focus on the third and fourth factors: the interests of the United
States and the interests of the public in complete, consistent and efficient
settlement of controversies.329 Courts should also be sensitive about the
historical connection between the United States and Indians and should make
an informed ruling that takes into account the circumstances in which Indians
often involuntarily found themselves.
Questioning the United States’ interests allows courts to evaluate whether
the federal government would be harmed through joinder.330 If the United
States asserts its indispensability, and the court so rules, the Indian claimants
may eventually be relegated to petitioning Congress for an express waiver of

325. State’s Motion to Dismiss ¶8.
326. See State’s Motion to Intervene.
327. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
328. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 119.
329. Indeed, these are the factors on which the Sokaogon Chippewa court focused primarily.
See supra Part V.D.
330. The Provident Tradesmens court also focused on the third factor. See supra note 141
and accompanying text.
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sovereign immunity or some other legislative action that can address the tribe’s
claim. Although this delays satisfaction,331 or at least adjudication, of the
tribe’s claim, pursuing political avenues has produced results.332 Where the
United States expresses no opinion with respect to its indispensability,
however, as in Sokaogon Chippewa, the court should recognize the United
States’ desire that it not block the plaintiff tribe’s litigation. In this way the
fourth factor, the public’s concern for efficient adjudication, is also satisfied
because the suit will proceed and move further toward resolution.
The fourth factor is also a proper one upon which courts should focus
because it allows for the injection of the factual peculiarities of each case. This
factor permits courts to consider general notions of fairness, as the Sokaogon
Chippewa opinion acknowledged with respect to the great injustices visited
upon American Indians.333 Conversely, but equally important, this factor
demands courts not ignore the interests of the current landowners.
A proper indispensability analysis should also lend appropriate weight to
the United States’ historically significant role in Indian affairs. The mere
appearance of a connection between the United States’ interests and the
plaintiff tribe’s litigation should not persuade courts to depart from a full
analysis as required by Provident Tradesmens.334
The nexus between the plaintiff and third party that makes a typical third
party indispensable may not, upon proper application of Provident
Tradesmens, make the United States an indispensable party in an Indian land
claim. This is so because Provident Tradesmens requires courts to consider the
availability of another forum to the plaintiff. Thus, even where those arguing
the United States is indispensable can show the necessary factual nexus
between the United States and the plaintiff tribe, courts’ analysis of the
availability of another forum for the plaintiff may result in a ruling that the
United States is not indispensable. When courts adhere to Provident
Tradesmens, even in the face of significant links between the United States’
interests and those of the litigants, the ruling on indispensability will be made
properly.
While minimizing the harsh results procedural hurdles can produce in
Indian land claims is a worthwhile goal, especially due to the oftenoverwhelming substantive challenges faced by the claimants, this alone is no
basis to rule a party is not indispensable. Sensitivity to the concerns of Indian
331. This sort of delay produces unattractive results for others, as well. Landowners in the
claim area may be confronted with significant frustration regarding the legitimacy of their title.
332. Lobbying of this sort was, after all, the catalyst for passage of the ICCA. See supra Part
II.D (discussing the ICCA).
333. See supra note 271.
334. This was one of the deficiencies in the State’s Motion to Intervene in Miami. See supra
Part V.F.
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land claimants, however, when combined with the potentially great unrest such
a claim can cause surrounding landowners, favors the resolution of Indian land
claims sooner rather than later. Courts that are faithful to Provident
Tradesmens by making a proper indispensability analysis will not only settle
unrest regarding these claims, but will also ensure that the courts are not
responsible for yet another injustice to be borne by American Indians.
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